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Abstract
Many adversarial attacks have been proposed to investi-
gate the security issues of deep neural networks. For the
black-box setting, current model stealing attacks train a
substitute model to counterfeit the functionality of the tar-
get model. However, the training requires querying the
target model. Consequently, the query complexity remains
high and such attacks can be defended easily by deploy-
ing the defense mechanism. In this study, we aim to learn
a generalized substitute model called MetaSimulator that
can mimic the functionality of the unknown target mod-
els. To this end, we build the training data with the form
of multi-tasks by collecting query sequences generated in
the attack of various existing networks. The learning con-
sists of a double-network framework, including the task-
specific network and MetaSimulator network, to learn the
general simulation capability. Specifically, the task-specific
network computes each task’s meta-gradient, which is fur-
ther accumulated from multiple tasks to update MetaSim-
ulator to improve generalization. When attacking a target
model that is unseen in training, the trained MetaSimula-
tor can simulate its functionality accurately using its lim-
ited feedback. As a result, a large fraction of queries can
be transferred to MetaSimulator in the attack, thereby re-
ducing the high query complexity. Comprehensive exper-
iments conducted on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and TinyIm-
ageNet datasets demonstrate the proposed approach saves
twice the number of queries on average compared with the
baseline method. The source code is released on https:
//github.com/machanic/MetaSimulator.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks [17, 50], which add human-imperceptible per-
turbations to the benign image to cause the target model to
misclassify it. The study of adversarial attacks is crucial in
benign image 𝒙𝟎
Black Box Model
𝜽
Trained MetaSimulator
𝒙𝟎 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟏
𝒙𝟎 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟐
adv image 𝒙𝟏
𝒙𝟏 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟏
𝒙𝟏 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟐
adv image 𝒙𝒕
𝒙𝒕 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟏
𝒙𝒕 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟐
output of  𝒙𝟎 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟏
output of  𝒙𝟎 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟐
output of  𝒙𝟏 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟏
output of  𝒙𝟏 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟐
output of  𝒙𝒕 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟏
output of  𝒙𝒕 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟐
Fine-tuned MetaSimulator
fine-tune for 𝑻 iterations
adv image 𝒙𝒕+𝟏
𝒙𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟏
𝒙𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟐 𝜽
output of  𝒙𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟏
output of  𝒙𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜹 ⋅ 𝒒𝟐
…
fine-tune
… …
update
update
…
subsequent queries  MetaSimulator
update
fine-tune
Figure 1: The attack procedure of MetaSimulator, where q1
and q2 are perturbations for generating query pairs in the
attack (Algorithm 2). The queries of the first t iterations are
fed into the target model to estimate the gradients. These
queries and corresponding outputs are collected to fine-tune
the MetaSimulator, which is trained without using the tar-
get model. The fine-tuned MetaSimulator can simulate the
unknown target model accurately, thereby transferring the
queries and improving the query-efficiency.
identifying the weakness of DNNs [50, 4] and consequently
contributes to the implementation of robust DNNs [37].
Adversarial attacks can be categorized into two main at-
tacks, i.e., white-box and black-box attacks. In white-box
attack setting, the target model is exposed fully to the ad-
versary. Thus, the perturbation can be crafted easily using
gradient information [37, 6, 17]. In black-box attack setting,
the adversary has partial information of the target model,
and crafts adversarial examples without any gradient infor-
mation. The black-box attack setting is more practical in
real-world systems. Many studies [46, 7, 13, 23, 5, 53, 25]
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have been proposed to perform black-box attacks and these
methods can be divided into two categories, i.e., query-
based attacks and transfer-based attacks.
Given that the gradient information cannot be obtained
directly in the black-box setting, query-based attacks focus
on the gradient estimation via zeroth-order optimizations
[7, 53, 23, 25, 39]. These attacks turn out to be highly effec-
tive because of their satisfactory attack success rate. Despite
the practical merit of query-based attacks, the high query
complexity is inevitable for computing the high precision
approximate gradient, making their procedures costly. In
addition, the queries are typically underutilized, i.e., the im-
plicit but profound messages returned from the target model
are overlooked because they are abandoned after estimating
the gradients. How to make full use of the limited feed-
back of the target model to enhance the query-efficiency
of attacks should be considered.
Transfer-based attacks generate adversarial examples by
using a standard white-box attack method on a pre-trained
source model to fool the target model [40, 33, 45, 58, 9, 42,
11, 22, 26, 51]. The major problems of the transfer-based
attacks are that (1) they cannot achieve a high success rate;
(2) they are weak in the targeted attack. To improve the
transferability, model stealing attacks train a local substi-
tute model to mimic the black-box model using a synthetic
dataset, in which the labels are given by the target model
through queries [35, 52, 46, 43]. The difference between
the substitute and the target model is minimized, and thus
the attack success rate is increased. However, the training
requires querying the target model. Consequently, the query
complexity remains high and such attacks can be defended
easily by deploying defense mechanisms (e.g., [44, 30]).
Besides, the inevitable re-training to substitute a new tar-
get model is expensive. Hence, how to train a substitute
model without the requirement of the target model is
worth exploring.
To eliminate the requirement of the target model dur-
ing training, we propose a meta-learning-based approach
to learn a generalized substitute model over many different
networks, thereby exploiting their characteristics to achieve
fast adaptation. The generalized substitute model named
MetaSimulator can adapt to mimic the output of the tar-
get model which is unseen in training. Consequently, a
large fraction of queries can be transferred to MetaSimula-
tor in the attack, thereby reducing the high query complex-
ity (Fig. 1). To this end, the proposed approach is equipped
with a double-network framework to learn from tasks. Each
task is a small data subset which is a query sequence gen-
erated during attacking a randomly selected pre-trained net-
work. A large number of tasks allow MetaSimulator to ex-
perience the attacks of various networks, thereby assisting
it in adapting to simulate the unknown target model rapidly.
The gradients and meta-gradients of a batch of randomly
sampled tasks are computed and finally aggregated by the
optimization to update MetaSimulator to improve general-
ization. In the attack, the trained MetaSimulator will be
further fine-tuned with the limited feedback of the unknown
target model to simulate its output accurately, thereby trans-
ferring the query stress from the target model (Fig. 1). The
proposed approach bridges the gap between model steal-
ing attacks and the query-based ones: the query complexity
of the attack is reduced by using MetaSimulator which is
trained without using the target model. The elimination of
the target model in training poses a new security threat in
real-world systems: the attacker with the least amount of
information about the target model can also mount a suc-
cessful attack.
We evaluate the proposed method on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-
100 [29], and TinyImageNet [48] datasets and compare it
with nature evolution strategy (NES) [24], Bandits [25],
Meta Attack [15], random gradient-free (RGF) method [9],
and prior-guided RGF (P-RGF) method [9]. The results
show the proposed approach saves twice the number of
queries compared with the baseline method on average
without sacrificing the attack success rate.
The main contributions are summarized as follows.
(1) We propose a novel black-box attack to bridge the
gap between model stealing attacks and the query-based
ones. Powered by meta-learning, the attacker can learn a
substitute model to simulate the target model which is un-
seen in training for the first time.
(2) We propose to train a generalized substitute model
called MetaSimulator on the queries collected from attack-
ing various networks. Consequently, the query complexity
of the attack is reduced by transferring a large fraction of
queries to MetaSimulator.
(3) Extensive experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100,
and TinyImageNet datasets demonstrate the superior query-
efficiency of the proposed method.
2. Background
In this section, we introduce the backgrounds of black-
box adversarial attacks and meta-learning.
2.1. Black-box Adversarial Attacks
Black-box attacks can be divided into two categories:
query-based attacks and transfer-based attacks. Query-
based attacks can be further divided into score-based at-
tacks and decision-based attacks based on how much in-
formation returned from the target model that the adver-
sary can utilize. Score-based attacks use the output prob-
abilities (scores) of the target model to generate adversarial
examples. Most score-based attacks estimate the approx-
imate gradient through zeroth-order optimizations [7, 23,
5, 15, 53]. Early studies [7, 5] estimated the gradient via
sampling from a noise distribution around the pixels, such
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as zeroth order optimization attack (ZOO) [7], which uses
a two-sided estimation to calculate the gradient of the ith
pixel as follows:
gˆi =
L(x+ hei, y)− L(x− hei, y)
2h
≈ ∂L(x, y)
∂xi
, (1)
where h is a parameter that controls the accuracy of the esti-
mation and ei is the canonical basis vector (ei is 1 in the ith
coordinate and 0 elsewhere). After obtaining the approx-
imate gradient, the adversary optimizes the adversarial ex-
ample iteratively with typical steps that follow the projected
gradient descent attack (PGD) [37]:
xadvt+1 =
∏
Bp(x,)
(xadvt + η · gt), (2)
where xadvt denotes the adversarial example optimized at
step t, x represents the original benign image,
∏
Bp(x,)
is the operation that projects examples onto the `p ball
centered at x with the radius of , η denotes the learning
rate, and gt is the estimated gradient. Although this type
of approach can deliver a successful attack, it requires an
extremely large number of queries to estimate the gradi-
ents in the high-resolution image because each pixel needs
two queries. Methods are improved to reduce the search
space by using the principal components of the data [5],
searching perturbations in a latent space with reduced di-
mension [53], utilizing prior information about the gradi-
ent [25], utilizing evolutionary strategies [2], using random
search [18, 3], searching the solution among the vertices
of the `∞ ball [39], or adopting the Bayesian optimiza-
tion [49]. In decision-based attacks, the attacker only knows
the output label of the target model. Typical decision-based
attacks include Boundary attack [14], N attack [31], Sign-
OPT [8], etc. In this study, we focus on the score-based
attack setting.
Transfer-based attacks generate adversarial examples on
a source model and then transfer them to the target model
[40, 33, 45, 42, 11, 22, 26, 51], or utilize the gradient in-
formation provided by a surrogate model [58, 9]. Transfer-
based attacks cannot achieve a high attack success rate be-
cause of the difference between the source model and the
target model. Many efforts have been devoted to improv-
ing the attack success rate (e.g., the use of an ensemble of
source models [32]). Other efforts include model stealing
attacks.
The original goal of model stealing attacks is to replicate
the functionality of the public service by exploiting black-
box access and no longer need to pay for the service [42,
54, 35, 52, 38, 10, 43]. This replication expands the scope of
model stealing attacks. For example, Papernot et al. [45, 46]
trained a substitute model to mimic the target model using
a synthetic dataset labeled by the target model. Then, the
local substitute is used to craft adversarial examples that can
be transferred to the target model. This type of attack can be
classified as a special type of transfer-based attack. In this
study, we focus on enhancing this type of model stealing
attack, i.e., how to train a substitute without using the target
model. The terminologies of this study are as follows.
Target model: the victim black-box model of the attack.
Untargeted attack: the goal of this attack is to craft the ad-
versarial examples that can be classified into any incorrect
class.
Targeted attack: the goal of this attack is to craft the ad-
versarial examples that can only be classified into the target
class.
Query pair: the proposed attack uses the two-sided gradi-
ent estimation, in which a gradient is computed by integrat-
ing information between two consecutive queries.
Evolving queries: the queries that are updated iteratively
during the attack process are evolving queries.
2.2. Meta-learning
Meta-learning is a learning-to-learn strategy that is use-
ful in solving few-shot problems. In this strategy, the
meta-learner can learn new skills or adapt to new environ-
ments rapidly with only a few samples. To achieve such
generalization, typical meta-learning methods (e.g., model-
agnostic meta-learning (MAML) [16]) are trained over a
large number of tasks, which are defined as the small sub-
sets of the original dataset, to allow the method optimize
for the best performance over the task distribution, includ-
ing potentially unseen tasks. In the testing phase, the meta-
learner needs to be fine-tuned on a few labeled test samples
to adapt to the test data. To utilize meta-learning in the ad-
versarial attack field, Ma et al. [36] proposed MetaAdvDet
to detect evolving adversarial attacks, which can recognize
new types of adversarial examples with high accuracy. Meta
Attack [15] trains an auto-encoder-based meta-learner on
the gradients of multiple types of networks. After training,
the gradients of the target model can be directly predicted
by the meta-learner, thereby reducing the query complex-
ity. Meta Attack is promising but it uses ZOO [7] to cal-
culate approximate gradients for fine-tuning meta-learner,
which yields a large number of queries and memory con-
sumption. The prediction of the gradient map is also diffi-
cult for the auto-encoder, especially in the case of a high-
resolution map. The proposed method uses the steps from
Bandits attack to estimate gradients in the attack, which are
more query-efficient than ZOO. In addition, MetaSimula-
tor predicts the logits output rather than the gradient map,
hence the performance is not affected by the resolution of
input.
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Figure 2: The procedure of training MetaSimulator in one mini-batch (best viewed in color). The sequences of query pairs
generated during the attack are collected as the training data and subsequently reorganized as multi-tasks. Each task contains
the data generated from attacking one network and is divided into meta-train set and meta-test set. To learn from these tasks,
the double-network framework includes the MetaSimulator network M and the task-specific network T. T initializes the
parameters from M and subsequently trains on the meta-train set. After several iterations (inner update step), T converges
and calculates meta-gradient Gi on the meta-test set of the ith task. The meta-gradients of all K tasks are accumulated as∑K
i=1Gi to update the parameters of M. The updated M is then prepared for the next mini-batch learning. Finally, the
learned MetaSimulator can simulate unknown black-box models using limited queries in the attack stage.
3. Method
3.1. Overview
The proposed approach consists of two stages: train-
ing stage for training MetaSimulator and attack stage that
uses the trained MetaSimulator to reduce the query com-
plexity of the attack. In the training stage (Algorithm 1),
the MetaSimulator is trained on a large number of tasks.
To construct the tasks, we collect the queries and corre-
sponding outputs generated in attacking various networks
and reorganize them as the form of multi-tasks (Fig. 2 left);
each task only contains the data collected from one network.
The purpose of introducing the data generated during the
attack is to allow MetaSimulator to distinguish subtle dif-
ferences of evolving queries. A large number of tasks cre-
ate a huge simulation environment of various networks to
improve the general simulation capability. The proposed
approach is equipped with a double-network framework
with the learning-to-learn strategy to learn from these tasks.
This strategy learns how to simulate new models rapidly by
reusing the experience of simulating the existing ones.
In the attack stage (Algorithm 2), the first phase is called
“warm-up”, which uses a typical query-based attack algo-
rithm (i.e., Bandits attack) to query the target model di-
rectly. However, the difference is that queries and the cor-
responding feedback of the target model are collected for
fine-tuning the MetaSimulator. After fine-tuning, MetaSim-
ulator is used as the substitute for the target model. Thus,
subsequent k queries can be fed into MetaSimulator to alle-
viate the query stress of the target model. In addition, Algo-
rithm 2 feeds queries to the target model and MetaSimulator
alternately to refresh the simulation capability of the latter
and keep up with the latest trend of evolving queries.
3.2. Task Construction
In the attack, MetaSimulator must simulate the outputs
of any unknown target models accurately when the feed-
ing queries are only slightly different from each other. To
this end, MetaSimulator should learn from the real attack,
i.e., the intermediate data (query sequences & outputs) gen-
erated in the attacks of various networks. Thus, a variety
of pre-trained networksM1, . . . ,Mn are collected to con-
struct the training tasks. The data inside each task come
from the intermediate data generated by attacking one net-
work using Bandits attack1. The data sources used by Ban-
dits can be the training sets of the datasets, which have
different data distribution from the tested images used in
evaluation. The query pairs Q1, . . . , QV generated from
the randomly selected consecutive V iterations of the attack
are collected to form a task, which allows MetaSimulator to
learn from the evolution of the real attack’s queries.
Besides, in the attack stage, the trained MetaSimulator
must learn from the target model’s outputs generated in pre-
vious iterations to substitute the target model in subsequent
iterations (Fig. 1). To this end, each task is divided into two
subsets, namely, the meta-train set Dmtr, which is com-
1Bandits attack uses the two-sided gradient estimation, where two per-
turbations (a query pair) are used to estimate a gradient.
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posed of the first t query pairs Q1, . . . , Qt, and the meta-
test setDmte with the following query pairs Qt+1, . . . , QV .
The former is used in the inner update step of the train-
ing, which corresponds to the fine-tuning step of the attack
stage. The fine-tuning step is also performed on the queries
which generated in previous iterations (Fig. 1), just like the
selection of Q1, . . . , Qt in this set. The meta-test set corre-
sponds to the subsequent m query pairs of the attack stage
which are predicted by MetaSimulator; minimizing the test
error on this set is beneficial for improving the prediction
precision (the outer update step). Generally speaking, the
training stage and attack stage are connected seamlessly:
the partition of meta-train set and meta-test set in each task
(Fig. 2) matches two successive groups of attack iterations
(Fig. 1). The logits outputs ofM1, . . . ,Mn are termed as
“pseudo labels”. All query sequences and pseudo labels are
pre-stored in the memory to accelerate the training.
Algorithm 1 The Training Procedure of MetaSimulator
Input: Training dataset D, Bandits attack algorithm
A, pre-trained classification networks M1, . . . ,Mn,
MetaSimulator network M and its parameters Mθ, task-
specific network T and its parameters Tθ, feed-forward
function fTθ of T, loss function L(·, ·) defined in Eqn. 3.
Parameters: Training iterations N , meta-train set size t,
task size V , inner-update learning rate λ1, outer-update
learning rate λ2, inner updates iteration T .
Output: The learned MetaSimulator M
1: for iter ← 1 to N do
2: sample K benign images x1, . . . , xK from D
3: for k ← 1 to K do . iterate over K tasks
4: a networkMi ← sample fromM1, . . . ,Mn
5: Q1, . . . , QV ← A(xk,Mi) .
queries generated from randomly selected consecutive
V attack iterations
6: Dmtr ← Q1, . . . , Qt
7: Dmte ← Qt+1, . . . , QV
8: ptrain ←Mi(Dmtr)
9: ptest ←Mi(Dmte), . pseudo labels
10: Tθ ←Mθ . initialize T’s parameters
11: Tθ′ ← Tθ . Tθ will be used for calculating the
meta-gradient in the outer update
12: for j ← 1 to T do
13: GˆTθ′ ← ∇Tθ′L
(
fTθ′ (Dmtr) ,ptrain
)
14: Tθ′ ← Tθ′ − λ1 · GˆTθ′
15: end for
16: Gi ← ∇TθL
(
fTθ′ (Dmte) ,ptest
)
17: end for
18: Mθ ←Mθ − λ2
∑K
i=1Gi . outer update
19: end for
20: return M
Algorithm 2 The `2 Norm Attack of MetaSimulator
Input: Input image x ∈ RD where D is image dimension-
ality, true label y of x, feed-forward function f of target
model, MetaSimulator M, attack objective loss L(·, ·).
Parameters: Warm-up iterations t, meta-predict interval
m, Bandits exploration τ , finite difference probe δ, learn-
ing rate ηg & η.
Output: xadv that satisfies ‖xadv − x‖2 ≤ .
1: Initialize the adversarial example xadv ← x
2: Initialize the gradient to be estimated g← 0
3: Initialize D← deque(maxlen = t) . a bounded
double-ended queue with maximum length of t, adding
a full D leads it to drop its oldest item automatically
4: while not successful do
5: u← N (0N , 1DIN ·N )
6: q1← g + τu, q2← g − τu
7: q1← q1/‖q1‖2, q2← q2/‖q2‖2
8: if i ≤ t or (i− t) mod m = 0 then
9: yˆ1 ← f(xadv + δ · q1), yˆ2 ← f(xadv + δ · q2)
10: append {xadv +δ ·q1, yˆ1, xadv +δ ·q2, yˆ2} → D
11: if i > t then
12: Fine-tune M using D . Fine-tune M every
m iterations after the warm-up phase
13: end if
14: else
15: yˆ1 ←M(xadv+δ ·q1), yˆ2 ←M(xadv+δ ·q2)
16: end if
17: ∆g ← L(yˆ1,y)−L(yˆ2,y)τδ u
18: g← g + ηg ·∆g . `∞ norm attack uses:
gˆ← g+12 , g← gˆ·exp(ηg·∆g)−(1−gˆ)·exp(−ηg·∆g)gˆ·exp(ηg·∆g)+(1−gˆ)·exp(−ηg·∆g)
19: xadv ←
∏
B2(x,)(xadv+η ·
g
‖g‖2 ) . replacing this line
with xadv ←
∏
B∞(x,)(xadv + η · sign(g)) for `∞ norm
attack, and
∏
Bp(x,) means the `p norm projection
20: xadv ← Clip(xadv, 0, 1)
21: end while
22: return xadv
3.3. MetaSimulator Learning
Initialization. Algorithm 1 shows the training proce-
dure. We sample K tasks randomly to form a mini-batch.
The proposed approach is equipped with a double-network
framework which includes a MetaSimulator networkM and
a task-specific network T. T is cloned fromM for the learn-
ing of each task. Given that T andM use the same network,
the former initializes its parameters using the parameters of
the latter at the beginning of learning each mini-batch.
Meta-train. T uses the gradient descent to update its pa-
rameters based on the meta-train set Dmtr for several iter-
ations (inner update step). This step is similar to the tra-
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ditional supervised learning with a knowledge-distillation-
fashioned loss, which matches the fine-tuning step of the at-
tack, thereby connecting the training stage and attack stage.
Meta-test. After several iterations, T converges and com-
putes the meta-gradient Gi on the meta-test set of the
ith task. Gi calculated in Algorithm 1’s line 16 is a
high order gradient, thus we call it meta-gradient. Then,
meta-gradients G1, . . . , GK of K tasks are accumulated as∑K
i=1Gi. Because of the same architecture of the two net-
works,
∑K
i=1Gi can be used to update the parameters of M
(the outer update step), which allows this network to learn
the general simulation capability over all tasks.
Loss function. We adopt a knowledge-distillation-
fashioned loss to facilitate MetaSimulator to output a simi-
lar prediction with the sampled networkMi, which is used
in both the inner and outer step. Given two queriesQi,1 and
Qi,2 of the ith query pair Qi, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and n
is the number of query pairs in the meta-train/meta-test set.
The logits outputs of MetaSimulator andMi are denoted as
pˆ and p, respectively. The loss function is defined as
L(pˆ,p) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
pˆQi,1−pQi,1
)2
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
pˆQi,2−pQi,2)2
(3)
The two terms utilize the mean square error (MSE) to push
the prediction and the pseudo label close.
3.4. MetaSimulator Attack
Algorithm 2 shows the procedure of `2 norm attack
of MetaSimulator; the `∞ norm attack can be easily ob-
tained by modifying line 18 and line 19. To be consistent
with the training stage, we use the steps from Bandits at-
tack [25] to generate query pairs. Query pairs of the first
t iterations are fed to the target model (warm-up phase).
These queries and corresponding outputs are collected into
a double-ended queueD, which records the historical trajec-
tory of the evolving queries. D drops the oldest item once
it is full, which is beneficial for focusing on new queries
when fine-tuning M using D. After the warm-up phase,
subsequent query pairs are fed into the target model every
m iterations, and the fine-tuned MetaSimulator M takes the
rest. The gradient estimation step follows Bandits because
of its leading performance. The attack objective loss func-
tion involved in the gradient estimation is shown in Eqn. 4,
which is maximized during attack.
L(yˆ, t) =
{
maxj 6=t yˆj − yˆt, if untargeted attack;
yˆt −maxj 6=t yˆj , if targeted attack;
(4)
yˆ is the logits output of the target model, t is the target class
in the targeted attack and the true class in the untargeted
attack, and j indexes the other classes.
3.5. Relation to Prior Works
In this study, meta-learning and black-box attacks are not
simply 1+1 combined. The differences are as follows.
Relation to Meta-learning. MetaSimulator is deigned to
simulate the outputs of any target models accurately when
the feeding queries are only slightly different from each
other. To this end, it is learned from the intermediate data
(query sequences & outputs) of attacks in a knowledge-
distillation-fashioned way. None of existing meta-learning
methods learns a simulator in this way, they all focus on the
few-shot classification or reinforcement learning problem.
Relation to Meta Attack. Meta Attack [15] shares the sim-
ilar design philosophy with ours. However, it trains an auto-
encoder on benign image & gradient pairs, rather than the
data of the real attack. Hence it is weak in targeted attack.
Furthermore, the accurate prediction of the gradient map is
difficult for its lightweight auto-encoder, which results in its
poor performance in the high-resolution map.
Special Design. The proposed method connects the train-
ing stage and attack stage seamlessly: the partition of meta-
train set and meta-test set in each task (Fig. 2) matches two
successive groups of attack iterations (Fig. 1); it learns from
the outputs of multiple networks in a knowledge-distillation
way (via Eqn. 3), which is the same with the fine-tuning
step of the attack. In addition, Algorithm 2 feeds queries to
M and the target model alternately to learn from the outputs
of latest queries. A bounded length double-ended queue D
is used to collect them, which is beneficial for focusing on
new queries when fine-tuning M using D periodically. The
periodic fine-tuning is crucial for high attack success rate in
a difficult attack (e.g., targeted attack in Fig. 3b).
4. Experiment
4.1. Experiment Setting
Dataset and Target Models. The experiments are con-
ducted in CIFAR-10 [28], CIFAR-100 [28], and TinyIma-
geNet [48] datasets. Following previous studies [13, 58],
1,000 tested images are randomly selected from their val-
idation sets for evaluation, all of which are correctly clas-
sified by WRN-28 [59], ResNet-110 [20] and Inception-v3
[55]. For the selection of the hyperparameters, we select
another 1,000 images to build the validation set. In CIFAR-
10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, we follow Yan et al. [58] for
the selection of the following target models: (1) a 272-layer
PyramidNet+Shakedrop model (PyramidNet-272) [19, 57],
which is state-of-the-art network on CIFAR-10; (2) a model
obtained through a neural architecture search called GDAS
[12], which has a different architecture from the networks
used in training MetaSimulator; (3) WRN-28 [59] with 28
layers and 10 times width expansion; and (4) WRN-40 [59]
with 40 layers and 10 times width expansion. In Tiny-
ImageNet dataset, we select ResNeXt-101 (32x4d) [56],
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ResNeXt-101 (64x4d), and DenseNet-121 with a growth
rate of 32 [21] as target models.
Compared Methods. The Bandits attack [25] is selected
as the baseline. The compared methods include nature evo-
lution strategy (NES) [24], Bandits [25], Meta Attack [15],
random gradient-free (RGF) method [9], and prior-guided
RGF (P-RGF) method [9]. We directly use the official
implementation code of Meta Attack for the experiments.
The training data (i.e. images & gradients) of this attack
are generated using the pre-trained networks in the present
study. To achieve a fair comparison, we translate the code
of NES, RGF, and P-RGF from the official implementation
of TensorFlow [1] into the PyTorch [47] version in exper-
iments. The RGF and NES attacks calculate the gradients
of the images by using random perturbations. The P-RGF
attack improves the query-efficiency of RGF by incorporat-
ing the prior gradient of a surrogate model, which adopts
ResNet-110 [20] in the CIFAR-10 & CIFAR-100 datasets
and ResNet-101 [20] in the TinyImageNet dataset. Given
that the official implementations of RGF and P-RGF only
support the untargeted attack, both attacks are excluded in
the targeted attack experiments. All methods are limited to
the maximum of 10,000 queries in the untargeted and tar-
geted attack experiments for all datasets. Following Yan et
al. [58], we set the same  value for all attacks, which is
4.6 in `2 norm attack and 8/255 in `∞ norm attack. The
configurations of all methods are in the appendix.
Pre-trained Networks. To evaluate the capability
of simulating unknown target models, the selection of
M1, . . . ,Mn in Algorithm 1 should be different from the
target models. Thirteen networks are selected to generate
the training data of CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets and
Fifteen networks for the TinyImageNet dataset (detailed in
the appendix). In experiments of the attack of defensive
models (Sec. 4.4), we re-train MetaSimulator and Meta At-
tack by removing all ResNet networks, because all defen-
sive models adopt a ResNet-50 backbone.
Method Setting. In the training stage, we generate query
sequence data Q1, . . . , Q100 in each task, the meta-train set
Dmtr consists of Q1, . . . , Q50, and the meta-test set Dmte
consists of Q51, . . . , Q100. We select ResNet-34 [20] as
the backbone of the MetaSimulator to achieve the balance
between the performance and the training-time efficiency.
MetaSimulator is trained for three epochs over 30,000 tasks,
where 30 tasks are randomly sampled to form a mini-batch.
In the attack stage, the fine-tune iterations is set to 10 in the
first fine-tuning and reduced to 5 for subsequent ones. The
default parameters are listed in Tab. 1.
Evaluation Metric Following previous related studies [23,
25, 5, 58], we use the attack success rate, the average and
the median of queries to evaluate the performance of the at-
tacks. In the untargeted attack, an attack is successful if the
prediction of the target model is different from the ground-
name default description
backbone ResNet-34 the backbone of MetaSimulator.
λ1 of the inner update 0.001 learning rate for the gradient descent in the inner update.
λ2 of the outer update 0.01 learning rate for updating Mθ in the outer update.
maximum query times 10,000 an adversarial example which is produced by using more
than 10,000 queries is considered to be a failed attack.
`2 norm attack’s  4.6 the radius of `2 norm ball in `2 norm attack.
`∞ norm attack’s  8/255 the radius of `∞ norm ball in `∞ norm attack.
η of `2 norm attack 0.1 the image learning rate for updating image.
η of `∞ norm attack 1/255 the image learning rate for updating image.
ηg of `2 norm attack 0.1 OCO learning rate for updating the gradient g.
ηg of `∞ norm attack 1.0 OCO learning rate for updating the gradient g.
Bandits exploration τ 0.3 the Bandits hyperparameter for generating q1 and q2.
δ of `2 norm attack 0.01 the finite difference probe for perturbing input image.
δ of `∞ norm attack 0.1 the finite difference probe for perturbing input image.
inner update iterations 12 update iterations of learning meta-train set.
fine-tune iterations 10 iteration times of fine-tune during attacking.
meta-predict intervalm 5 target model only takes the queries everym iterations.
warm-up iterations t 10 warm-up phase indicates the first t iterations of attack.
deque D’s length 10 maximum length ofD,D drops its oldest item if it is full.
Table 1: The default parameters setting of MetaSimulator.
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Figure 3: Ablation studies of the simulation’s precision
(measured by average MSE), meta-predict interval, warm-
up iterations, and deque D’s maximum length by attacking
a WRN-28 model in CIFAR-10 dataset. The result shows
that (1) the meta training is beneficial for achieving an ac-
curate simulation (Fig. 3a); (2) targeted attack requires a
small meta-predict interval (Fig. 3b); and (3) more warm-
up iterations lead to higher Avg. query (Fig. 3c).
truth. In the targeted attack, an attack is successful if the
example is predicted as the target class.
4.2. Ablation Study
The ablation study inspects MetaSimulator using two as-
pects: validating the benefit of meta training and the effect
of key parameters.
Meta training. We validate the benefits of meta training
by comparing the performance of the proposed attack al-
gorithm with different backbones of the simulator. The
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MetaSimulator M is replaced with two networks for com-
parison, i.e., Simulatorrnd: a randomly initialized ResNet-
34 network, Simulatorvanilla: a ResNet-34 network that is
trained on the same data with MetaSimulator but without
using meta-learning. Tab. 2 shows the comparative ex-
perimental results of `2 norm attack in CIFAR-10 dataset.
The results indicate that MetaSimulator achieve the high-
est attack success rate and the minimum number of queries,
thereby confirming the benefit of using meta training. To in-
spect the effect of meta training on the simulation capacity,
we calculate the average MSE between the logits outputs of
the simulators and the target model at each attack iteration
(Fig. 3a). MetaSimulator achieve lower average MSE than
Simulatorvanilla in all attack iterations; the smaller deviation
of the prediction of the former than that of the latter signifies
its satisfactory simulation capability.
In the control experiments, we check the effect of the
key parameters of MetaSimulator on the CIFAR-10 dataset,
including meta-predict interval, warm-up iterations, and
dequeD’s maximum length. Only one parameter is adjusted
and the others are fixed as setting in Tab. 1.
Meta-predict interval is the iteration interval that uses
MetaSimulator M to make predictions. A larger meta-
predict interval results in more queries but the less op-
portunity of fine-tuning MetaSimulator. Consequently,
MetaSimulator cannot accurately simulate the target model
in a difficult attack, resulting in a low attack success rate.
Fig. 3b justifies our hypothesis that the attack success rate
curve of the targeted attack (red curve) declines because this
attack is more difficult than the untargeted attack.
Warm-up Fig. 3c suggests that more warm-up iterations
yield a higher Avg. query, because more queries are fed
into the target model in the warm-up phase.
Deque D’s maximum length Fig. 3d shows that no ob-
vious trend of the query number is present in the different
maximum lengths.
4.3. Results of Attacks on Normal Models
The normal model is the classification model without the
defensive mechanism. We conduct untargeted attack and
targeted attack experiments on the target models described
in Sec. 4.1. In the targeted attack, the target class is set
Target Model Method Avg. Query Med. Query Success Rate
WRN-28
Simulatorvanilla 73 34 100%
Simulatorrnd 65 34 100%
MetaSimulator 48 34 100%
Table 2: Comparative experiment of `2 norm attack in
CIFAR-10 dataset. Simulatorrnd uses a randomly initialized
ResNet-34 as the simulator, Simulatorvanilla uses a ResNet-
34 trained without meta-learning as the simulator.
to yadv = (y + 1) mod C for all attacks, where yadv is
the target class, y is the true class, and C is the class num-
ber. RGF [9] and P-RGF [9] are excluded from the tar-
geted attack experiments because their official implementa-
tions do not support the targeted attack. Tab. 3 and Tab. 4
show the results of the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.
Tab. 6 and Tab. 7 show the results of the TinyImageNet
dataset. The results reveal that: (1) MetaSimulator can gain
up to 2× reduction in the average and median of the queries
compared with the baseline Bandits; and (2) MetaSimulator
obtains significantly fewer queries and higher attack suc-
cess rate than Meta Attack [15]. The poor performance of
Meta Attack can be attributed to its high gradient estimation
cost (i.e., it uses the ZOO method [7] for gradient estima-
tion). Furthermore, the lightweight auto-encoder of Meta
Attack cannot precisely predict the gradient map, especially
in high-resolution images (e.g., Tab. 6 and Tab. 7).
Tab. 3, Tab. 4, Tab. 6, and Tab. 7 show the results
when the maximum number of queries is set to 10,000. To
further inspect the attack success rate at different maximum
queries, we conduct untargeted attack experiments by limit-
ing different maximum queries of each adversarial example
and comparing their attack success rates. Fig. 4 demon-
strates the superiority of the proposed approach in terms of
attack success rate. Fig. 5 demonstrates the relation be-
tween query and attack success rate from the different an-
gle. It displays the average number of queries that reaches
different desired success rates. Specifically, given a desired
success rate a and the query list Q of all samples, the aver-
age query is defined as:
Avg. Qa =
∑N
i=1 Qˆi
N
, where Qˆ = Q[Q ≤ Pa], (5)
wherePa is the ath percentile value ofQ andN is the length
of Qˆ. Fig. 5 shows that the proposed approach is more
query-efficient than other attacks and the gap is amplified
for higher success rates.
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(b) ResNext-101 in TinyImageNet
Figure 4: Comparison of attack success rate at different lim-
ited maximum queries in untargeted attack under `∞ norm,
where ResNext-101 indicates ResNext-101(32×4d).
4.4. Results of Attacks on Defensive Models
Tab. 5 shows the experimental results of attacking defen-
sive models. ComDefend [27] and Feature Distillation [34]
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Dataset Norm Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40 PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40 PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40
CIFAR-10
`2
NES [23] 99.3% 74.8% 99.9% 99.5% 202 123 159 154 200 100 100 100
RGF [9] 100% 100% 100% 100% 216 168 153 150 204 152 102 152
P-RGF [9] 100% 100% 100% 100% 64 40 76 73 62 20 64 64
Meta Attack [15] 84.2% 92.9% 92.4% 95.1% 3410 2097 2202 1996 2862 1561 1562 1433
Bandits [25] 100% 100% 100% 100% 151 66 107 98 110 54 80 78
MetaSimulator 100% 100% 100% 100% 92 34 48 51 52 26 34 34
`∞
NES [23] 86.8% 71.4% 74.2% 77.6% 1559 628 1235 1209 600 300 400 400
RGF [9] 99% 93.8% 98.6% 98.8% 955 646 1178 928 668 460 663 612
P-RGF [9] 97.3% 97.9% 97.7% 98% 742 337 703 564 408 128 236 217
Meta Attack [15] 33.8% 61.7% 64% 71.7% 3668 3055 2658 2566 2864 2344 1950 1823
Bandits [25] 99.6% 100% 99.4% 99.9% 1015 391 611 542 560 166 224 228
MetaSimulator 96.5% 99.9% 98.1% 98.8% 779 248 466 419 466 82 186 186
CIFAR-100
`2
NES [23] 92.5% 90.1% 98.3% 99.7% 118 83 103 106 100 50 100 100
RGF [9] 100% 100% 100% 100% 114 110 106 106 102 101 102 102
P-RGF [9] 100% 100% 100% 100% 54 46 54 73 62 62 62 62
Meta Attack [15] 99.1% 99.7% 99.7% 98.3% 850 798 1098 1163 651 524 781 782
Bandits [25] 100% 100% 100% 100% 58 54 64 65 42 42 52 52
MetaSimulator 100% 100% 100% 100% 29 29 33 34 24 24 26 26
`∞
NES [23] 91.3% 89.7% 92.5% 89.5% 430 266 660 606 200 150 250 250
RGF [9] 99.7% 98.8% 98.9% 99% 385 420 544 628 256 255 357 357
P-RGF [9] 99.3% 98.3% 98% 97.8% 308 220 371 480 147 116 136 181
Meta Attack [15] 99.7% 99.5% 98.3% 97.1% 932 922 1142 1226 653 652 782 782
Bandits [25] 100% 100% 99.8% 99.8% 266 209 262 260 68 56 106 92
MetaSimulator 100% 100% 99.9% 99.9% 129 124 196 209 34 28 58 54
Table 3: Experiment results of untargeted attack in CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.
Dataset Norm Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40 PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40 PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40
CIFAR-10
`2
NES [23] 93.7% 95.3% 98.5% 97.7% 1474 1515 1043 1088 1251 999 881 882
Meta Attack [15] 35.2% 70.9% 55.1% 56.4% 4584 3809 4131 4097 4352 3328 3586 3714
Bandits [25] 99.7% 100% 97.3% 98.4% 852 718 1082 997 458 538 338 398
MetaSimulator (m = 3) 97.6% 99.9% 96.4% 94% 815 715 836 793 368 400 206 244
MetaSimulator (m = 5) 93.2% 99.1% 91.8% 89.2% 643 674 610 581 324 378 170 200
`∞
NES [23] 63.8% 80.7% 89.7% 88.8% 4355 3942 3046 3051 3717 3441 2535 2592
Meta Attack [15] 44% 81.8% 56.2% 53.9% 4669 3571 3468 3343 4353 2945 2817 2817
Bandits [25] 84.5% 98.3% 76.9% 79.9% 2830 1755 2037 2128 2078 1162 1178 1188
MetaSimulator (m = 5) 78.7% 96.5% 80.9% 80.4% 2474 1470 1676 1660 1908 916 956 956
CIFAR-100
`2
NES [23] 87.6% 77% 89.3% 87.5% 1300 1405 1383 1424 1102 1172 1061 1049
Meta Attack [15] 85% 89.1% 63.2% 42.3% 3833 3521 4713 4861 3457 2946 4481 4610
Bandits [25] 99.6% 100% 98.9% 91.5% 1442 847 1645 2436 1056 678 1150 1578
MetaSimulator (m = 3) 99.3% 100% 98.6% 92.7% 921 724 1150 1552 666 518 778 1126
MetaSimulator (m = 5) 97.8% 99.6% 95.7% 83.9% 829 679 1000 1211 644 508 706 906
`∞
NES [23] 72.1% 66.8% 68.4% 69.9% 4673 5174 4763 4770 4376 4832 4357 4508
Meta Attack [15] 80.2% 81% 55.3% 39.3% 3955 3778 4617 4611 3330 3457 4354 4289
Bandits [25] 81.2% 92.5% 72.4% 56% 3222 2798 3353 3465 2632 2132 2760 2774
MetaSimulator (m = 5) 83.9% 91.4% 74.2% 60.1% 2410 2134 2569 2821 1754 1572 2032 2244
Table 4: Experiment results of targeted attack in CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, where m is meta-predict interval.
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Figure 5: Comparison of the average query per successful
image at different success rates in the untargeted attack un-
der `∞ norm. More results are shown in the appendix.
are equipped with a denoiser to transform the input images
before feeding to the target model. PCL [41] introduces
a new loss function to maximally separate the intermedi-
ate features of each class. All defensive models adopt a
ResNet-50 backbone. Results of Tab. 5 conclude:
(1) MetaSimulator exhibits the best performance in
breaking ComDefend. Its attack success rate is higher than
Bandits, 20.3% higher and 24.3% higher in CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 datasets, respectively.
(2) Meta Attack demonstrates poor performance in
ComDefend and Feature Distillation because of its unsat-
isfactory attack success rate. By contrast, the proposed ap-
proach can break this type of defensive models with a high
success rate.
9
Dataset Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
ComDefend [27] PCL [41] Feature Distillation [34] ComDefend [27] PCL [41] Feature Distillation [34] ComDefend [27] PCL [41] Feature Distillation [34]
CIFAR-10
NES [23] 60.8% 65% 54.5% 1245 728 1474 550 150 450
RGF [9] 41.9% 82.6% 44.4% 2061 1107 1717 1173 306 768
P-RGF [9] 52.1% 80.4% 65.8% 2087 1006 1979 1115 230 703
Meta Attack [15] 19.6% 74% 37.8% 2363 1547 2463 1562 781 1560
Bandits [25] 44.7% 84% 59.6% 1132 776 736 140 126 96
MetaSimulator 65% 78.7% 61.5% 242 621 407 28 114 54
CIFAR-100
NES [23] 78% 87.9% 77.6% 727 429 1071 300 150 250
RGF [9] 66.7% 95.5% 62% 1723 645 1208 816 204 408
P-RGF [9] 78.4% 96.1% 73.4% 1523 679 1169 630 182 262
Meta Attack [15] 41.2% 90.3% 54.4% 2341 1123 1813 1173 521 912
Bandits [25] 56.2% 97% 80.9% 297 321 523 22 34 42
MetaSimulator 80.5% 92.6% 80.3% 316 236 223 36 20 24
Table 5: Experiment results of untargeted attack under `∞ norm on defensive models in CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.
All defensive models adopt the backbone of ResNet-50. Results of TinyImageNet dataset are listed in the appendix.
Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
D121 R32×4d R64×4d D121 R32×4d R64×4d D121 R32×4d R64×4d
NES [23] 74.6% 45.4% 45.4% 1358 2038 2038 500 800 800
RGF [9] 96.4% 85.3% 87.5% 1146 2088 2097 667 1280 1326
P-RGF [9] 94.5% 83.9% 85.9% 883 1583 1581 448 657 690
Meta Attack [15] 71.6% 36% 37.4% 3973 3979 4109 3329 3585 3457
Bandits [25] 99.2% 94.1% 95.3% 964 1737 1662 520 954 1014
MetaSimulator 99.4% 96.8% 98.6% 811 1380 1514 428 850 880
Table 6: Experiment results of untargeted attack under `∞
norm in TinyImageNet dataset. D121: DenseNet-121, R32:
ResNeXt-101 (32×4d), R64: ResNeXt-101 (64×4d).
Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
D121 R32×4d R64×4d D121 R32×4d R64×4d D121 R32×4d R64×4d
NES [23] 88.5% 88% 88.2% 4625 4959 4758 4337 4702 4440
Meta Attack [15] 23.7% 20.7% 17.9% 5351 5537 5601 5250 5249 5248
Bandits [25] 85.1% 72.2% 72.4% 2724 3550 3542 1860 2698 2852
MetaSimulator 89.8% 84.9% 83.9% 1959 2558 2488 1396 1966 1982
Table 7: Experiment results of targeted attack under `2
norm in TinyImageNet dataset. D121: DenseNet-121, R32:
ResNeXt-101 (32×4d), R64: ResNeXt-101 (64×4d).
5. Conclusion
In this study, we present a novel black-box attack method
that trains a generalized substitute model named MetaSim-
ulator to mimic unknown target models accurately for re-
ducing the query complexity. To eliminate the requirement
of target models in training, the query sequences gener-
ated during attacking many different pre-trained networks
are used as the training data with the form of multi-tasks.
The proposed approach is equipped with a double-network
framework with a learning-to-learn strategy to learn the
general simulation capability. After training, a large frac-
tion of queries can be transferred to MetaSimulator, thereby
significantly reducing the query complexity of the attack.
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A. Experiment Settings
A.1. Compared Methods
NES attack: Hyperparameters for NES attack [23] are
listed in Tab. 8. In the targeted `p norm attack setting, NES
uses a randomly chosen image of target class as the initial
image to optimize. Then, it iteratively modifies the image
so that its distance from the original input image is getting
smaller and smaller. Finally, the `p distance between the
produced adversarial image and the original image is within
a preset . Thus, the hyperparameters of NES attack are
carefully tuned in untargeted and targeted attack separately,
so as to achieve the highest attack success rate. The exper-
iments of NES attack are conducted by using the PyTorch
implementation, which is translated from the original Ten-
sorFlow implementation.
Meta Attack: Hyperparameters of Meta Attack [15] are
listed in Tab. 9, all the default values are specified by the
official implementation code. Note that in the experiments
of targeted attack and TinyImageNet dataset, the meta in-
terval m is set to 3, and which is set to 5 in the untargeted
attack of CIFAR-10/CIFAR-100 dataset. Meta Attack uses
the official PyTorch implementation to experiment, and the
gradients of training data are generated by using the same
pre-trained models with MetaSimulator, as listed in Tab. 13.
RGF and P-RGF attack: Hyperparameters of RGF [9]
and P-RGF [9] attacks follow the official implementation.
The experiments of RGF and P-RGF are conducted by us-
ing the Pytorch implementation that is translated from the
official TensorFlow implementation.
Bandits attack: Hyperparameters of Bandits attack [25]
are a subset of the hyperparameters of MetaSimulator, and
both methods set the same value to ensure the fairness of
comparison. The OCO learning rate is used to update the
prior, which is an alias of gradient g for updating the input
image.
A.2. Pre-trained Networks and Target Models
Pre-trained networks: In the training of MetaSimulator
and Meta Attack, we collect various types of networks to
generate the training data. In our experiments, 14 types of
networks and 15 types of networks are chosen in CIFAR-
10/CIFAR-100 and TinyImageNet datasets, respectively.
The list of these networks and their training configurations
are listed in Tab. 13.
Target models: In order to evaluate the performance of at-
tacking unknown models, we specify the target models to
equip with completely different architectures from the pre-
trained networks. The target models and their complexity
are listed in Tab. 12.
Dataset Attack Norm Hyperparameter Value
CIFAR-10
Untargeted
`2
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
h, image learning rate 2.0
`∞
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
h, image learning rate 1e-2
Targeted
`2
0, initial distance from the source im-
age
20.0
, final radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  1.0
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying  0.1
hmax, the maximum image learning rate 2.0
hmin, the minimum image learning rate 5e-5
`∞
0, initial distance from the source im-
age
1.0
, final radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  0.1
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying  0.01
hmax, the maximum image learning rate 0.1
hmin, the minimum image learning rate 0.01
CIFAR-100
Untargeted
`2
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
h, image learning rate 2.0
`∞
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
h, image learning rate 1e-2
Targeted
`2
0, initial distance from the source im-
age
20.0
, final radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  1.0
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying  0.3
hmax, the maximum image learning rate 1.0
hmin, the minimum image learning rate 5e-5
`∞
0, initial distance from the source im-
age
1.0
, final radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  0.1
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying  0.01
hmax, the maximum image learning rate 0.1
hmin, the minimum image learning rate 0.01
TinyImageNet
Untargeted
`2
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
h, image learning rate 2.0
`∞
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
h, image learning rate 1e-2
Targeted
`2
0, initial distance from the source im-
age
40.0
, final radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  1.0
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying  0.1
hmax, the maximum image learning rate 2.0
hmin, the minimum image learning rate 0.5
`∞
0, initial distance from the source im-
age
1.0
, final radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  0.1
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying  1e-3
hmax, the maximum image learning rate 0.1
hmin, the minimum image learning rate 0.01
Table 8: The hyperparameters of NES attack [23], where
the sampling variance σ for gradient estimation is set to
1e-3, the number of samples per draw is set to 50, and the
maximum queries is set to 10,000 for both untargeted and
targeted attack.
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Dataset Attack Norm Hyperparameter Value
CIFAR-10/100
Untargeted
`2
h, image learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimating gra-
dient
125
m, meta interval 5
use tanh, the change-of-variables
method
true
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
`∞
h, image learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimating gra-
dient
125
m, meta interval 5
use tanh, the change-of-variables
method
false
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
Targeted
`2
h, image learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimating gra-
dient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-variables
method
true
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
`∞
h, image learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimating gra-
dient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-variables
method
false
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
TinyImageNet
Untargeted
`2
h, image learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimating gra-
dient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-variables
method
true
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
`∞
h, image learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimating gra-
dient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-variables
method
false
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
Targeted
`2
h, image learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimating gra-
dient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-variables
method
true
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
`∞
h, image learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimating gra-
dient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-variables
method
false
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
Table 9: The hyperparameters of Meta Attack [15], where
the binary steps is set to 1, and the solver of gradient estima-
tion adopts the adam for all types of attacks in all datasets.
B. Experiment Results
B.1. Results of Attacks on Defensive Models
The experiment results of attacking the defensive models
in TinyImageNet dataset are listed in Tab. 14, where Fea-
ture Scatter [60] is an approach of adversarial training. Both
Norm Hyperparameter Value
`2
h, image learning rate 2.0
σ, sampling variance 1e-4
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
`∞
h, image learning rate 0.005
σ, sampling variance 1e-4
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
Table 10: The hyperparameters of RGF [9] and P-RGF [9]
attacks, where the surrogate model of P-RGF attack adopts
ResNet-110 in CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, and it
adopts ResNet-101 in TinyImageNet dataset.
Norm Hyperparameter Value
`2
δ, finite difference probe 0.01
η, image learning rate 0.1
ηg , OCO learning rate 0.1
τ , Bandits exploration 0.3
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
maximum query times 10,000
`∞
δ, finite difference probe 0.1
η, image learning rate 1/255
ηg , OCO learning rate 1.0
τ , Bandits exploration 0.3
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
maximum query times 10,000
Table 11: The hyperparameters of Bandits attack [25].
Dataset Network Model Details
Params(M) MACs(G) Layers
CIFAR-10
PyramidNet-272 26.21 4.55 272
GDAS 3.02 0.41 20
WRN-28 36.48 5.25 28
WRN-40 55.84 8.08 40
CIFAR-100
PyramidNet-272 26.29 4.55 272
GDAS 3.14 0.41 20
WRN-28 36.54 5.25 28
WRN-40 55.90 8.08 40
TinyImageNet
DenseNet-121 7.16 0.23 121
ResNeXt-101
(32×4d)
42.54 0.65 101
ResNeXt-101
(64×4d)
81.82 1.27 101
Table 12: The details of black-box target models which are
used for evaluating attack methods, where MAC is the mul-
tiplyaccumulate operation count.
ComDefend [27] and Feature Distillation [34] are based on
the input image preprocessing, the attack success rate of
Meta Attack is rather low under this type of defense. In con-
trast, the performance of MetaSimulator is significantly bet-
ter than that of baseline Bandits [25] in all defensive mod-
els, especially the ComDefend and Feature Distillation.
B.2. Figures of Experimental Results
The experimental results are demonstrated in the form
of two types of figures. The first type limits different max-
imum queries of attacks and compare their attack success
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Dataset Network Training Configuration Hyperparameters
epochs lr lr decay epochs lr decay rate weight decay layers other hyperparameters
CIFAR-10/100
AlexNet 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 5e-4 9 -
DenseNet-100 300 0.1 150, 225 0.1 1e-4 100 growth rate:12, compression
rate:2
DenseNet-190 300 0.1 150, 225 0.1 1e-4 190 growth rate:40, compression
rate:2
PreResNet-110 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 110 block name: BasicBlock
ResNeXt-29 (8 ×
64d)
300 0.1 150, 225 0.1 5e-4 29 widen factor:4, cardinality:8
ResNeXt-29 (16 ×
64d)
300 0.1 150, 225 0.1 5e-4 29 widen factor:4, cardinality:16
VGG-19 (BN) 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 5e-4 19 -
ResNet-20 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 20 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-32 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 32 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-44 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 44 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-50 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 50 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-56 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 56 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-110 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 110 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-1202 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 1202 block name: BasicBlock
TinyImageNet
VGG-11 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 11 -
VGG-11 (BN) 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 11 -
VGG-13 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 13 -
VGG-13 (BN) 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 13 -
VGG-16 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 16 -
VGG-16 (BN) 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 16 -
VGG-19 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 19 -
VGG-19 (BN) 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 19 -
ResNet-18 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 18 -
ResNet-34 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 34 -
ResNet-50 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 50 -
ResNet-101 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 101 -
DenseNet-161 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 161 growth rate: 32
DenseNet-169 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 169 growth rate: 32
DenseNet-201 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 201 growth rate: 32
Table 13: The list of pre-trained networks and their training configurations, these networks are used to generate the training
data of MetaSimulator and Meta Attack. All ResNet networks are excluded in the experiments of attack defensive models.
Dataset Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
ComDefend [27] PCL [41] Scatter [60] Distillation [34] ComDefend PCL Scatter Distillation ComDefend PCL Scatter Distillation
TinyImageNet
NES [23] 74.8% 73.1% 52.4% 33.7% 1326 863 2034 3325 500 250 650 2250
RGF [9] 43.7% 91.8% 32.8% 9.0% 1855 1022 1396 1619 765 408 714 765
P-RGF [9] 48.8% 91.8% 32.8% 25.7% 1986 1065 1482 2231 866 436 810 985
Meta Attack [15] 9.2% 74.9% 20.4% 3.7% 2173 2623 3646 4187 1431 1824 3381 2602
Bandits [25] 52.4% 95.8% 53.1% 12.5% 785 909 2147 1272 68 206 1152 182
MetaSimulator 54.6% 84.2% 43.5% 21.3% 265 586 1070 746 28 148 666 154
Table 14: Experiment results of untargeted `∞ norm attack on defensive models in TinyImageNet dataset, all defensive
models adopt the backbone of ResNet-50. Scatter is Feature Scatter [60], Distillation is Feature Distillation [34].
rates. Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 9 show this type of figures ob-
tained by attacking on normal models and defensive mod-
els. The second type of figures measure the average number
of queries over successful images by reaching a desired suc-
cess rate, it demonstrates the relation between query and at-
tack success rate from the different angle. Fig. 8 and Fig. 10
show the results. All the experiment results demonstrate
that MetaSimulator requires the lowest queries and achieves
the highest attack success rate, so the superior performance
of MetaSimulator is verified.
To observe the query number in detail, we collect the
query number of each adversarial example to draw the his-
togram figures. Fig. 11, Fig. 12, Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show
the query number’s histogram of attacks on CIFAR-10,
CIFAR-100, TinyImageNet and different defensive models.
The results show that the highest red bars (MetaSimulator)
are located in the low query number’s area, thereby confirm-
ing that most adversarial examples of MetaSimulator have
the fewest queries.
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Figure 6: Comparison of the attack success rate at different limited maximum queries in TinyImageNet dataset.
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(a) untargeted `∞ attack PyramidNet
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Figure 7: Comparison of attack success rate at different limited maximum queries using `∞ norm attack in CIFAR-100
dataset, where PyramidNet indicates PyramidNet-272.
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Figure 8: Comparison of the average query per successful image at different desired success rates in CIFAR-100 dataset.
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(a) attack ComDefend in CIFAR-10
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(d) attack Distillation in CIFAR-100
Figure 9: Comparison of the attack success rate at different maximum queries on defensive models with ResNet-50 backbone,
where Distillation indicates Feature Distillation [34].
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(a) attack ComDefend in CIFAR-10
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Figure 10: Comparison of the average query per successful image at different desired success rates on defensive models with
the backbone of ResNet-50, the experiments are conducted by using untargeted `∞ norm attack in CIFAR-10/CIFAR-100
datasets, where Distillation indicates Feature Distillation [34].
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(a) untargeted `2 attack PyramidNet-272
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Figure 11: The histogram of query number in the CIFAR-10 dataset, where PyramidNet indicates PyramidNet-272.
18
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
P-RGF
RGF
Meta Attack
MetaSimulator
(a) untargeted `2 attack PyramidNet-272
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Figure 12: The histogram of query number in the CIFAR-100 dataset.
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(a) untargeted `∞ attack DenseNet-121
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(b) untargeted `∞ attack ResNext-101(32×4d)
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(c) untargeted `∞ attack ResNext-101(64×4d)
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(e) targeted `2 attack ResNext-101(32×4d)
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(f) targeted `2 attack ResNext-101(64×4d)
Figure 13: The histogram of query number in the TinyImageNet dataset.
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(a) attack ComDefend [27] in CIFAR-10
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(b) attack Feature Distillation [34] in CIFAR-10
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(c) attack PCL [41] in CIFAR-10
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(d) attack ComDefend in CIFAR-100
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(e) attack Feature Distillation in CIFAR-100
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(f) attack PCL in CIFAR-100
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(g) attack ComDefend in TinyImageNet
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(h) attack Feature Distillation in TinyImageNet
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(i) attack PCL in TinyImageNet
Figure 14: The histogram of query number using untargeted attacks on defensive models.
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